A new peer-reviewed study has identified a constellation of Russian military satellites as the source of dozens of wide-area GPS disruption events affecting receivers simultaneously across Europe, Greenland, and Canada. The research, conducted by scientists at the University of Texas at Austin and Spanish technology company GMV, represents the first confirmed instance of satellite-based GPS interference at this scale — and arrives against a backdrop of near-daily ground-based jamming that European governments have characterised as deliberate hybrid warfare.
The satellites belong to Russia's Edinaya Kosmicheskaya Sistema (EKS), a missile-launch detection network. They operate in what are known as Molniya orbits — highly elliptical paths that hold a satellite over northern latitudes for extended periods and allow it to illuminate a far larger area of the Earth's surface than any ground- or aircraft-based transmitter could reach. The first EKS satellites launched in 2019, the same year the wide-area disruption events began.
The New York Times reported that the study documented 75 days since 2019 on which at least one wide-area transient GPS interference event was recorded. In at least three of those cases, disruption was definitively traced to the Russian satellites. Each event typically lasted three to five seconds but was detected simultaneously at monitoring stations spread across a geographic footprint that ruled out any terrestrial source.
The timing of the events carries its own suggestion. Computing reported that the disruptions occur predominantly on weekdays and during business hours, measured in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). Researchers say that pattern is inconsistent with a random technical fault and implies human involvement. Whether the interference is deliberate or an unintended consequence of EKS operations remains unknown, as does Russia's awareness of any civilian impact.
Senior US Air Force officials have been briefed on the findings. A person familiar with those briefings confirmed to the New York Times that the Russian satellite network was responsible, without specifying the number of incidents or attributing intent. Moscow has repeatedly denied carrying out GPS jamming; Russian officials have at times described jamming activities as defensive measures to protect cities and military assets from Ukrainian drone strikes.
A ground-based problem that has grown steadily more severe
The satellite findings emerge from a broader and longer-running pattern of interference. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, GPS jamming and spoofing in the Baltic Sea region has been recorded almost daily, Defense News reported. The practical consequences have included flight cancellations, temporary airport closures, and commercial vessels steered significantly off course.
The character of the interference has also evolved. By 2025, the dominant technique had shifted from jamming — which overwhelms a GPS signal — toward spoofing, which feeds false location data to receivers. Defense News reported that spoofing is harder to detect and harder to defend against than conventional jamming.
Attribution of ground-based sources has grown more precise. Polish researchers triangulated two coastal locations in Russia's Kaliningrad exclave — including the Okunevo antenna site — as the origin points of specific attacks recorded in April and May 2025, with a precision of approximately one kilometre, Defense News reported. Other identified sources lie near St. Petersburg and Pskov, regions with a concentration of Russian military and electronic warfare infrastructure, according to the Associated Press.
The volume of incidents has increased sharply across the region. Euronews reported that Lithuania recorded more than 1,000 cases of GPS interference in June 2025, a figure 22 times higher than in the same month of 2024. Estonia reported that 85 per cent of flights were affected. Poland recorded 2,732 cases in January 2025 alone. Latvia's Electronic Communications Office counted 820 instances of satellite signal interference across 2024, up from 26 in 2022, and warned that affected areas had recently expanded, the Associated Press reported.
Several high-profile incidents have brought the issue into public view. The BBC reported that a Royal Air Force aircraft carrying then-Defence Secretary Grant Shapps had its GPS jammed near Kaliningrad; a later incident involved an RAF aircraft carrying his successor, John Healey, returning from Estonia. The aircraft carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen experienced interference in Bulgarian airspace; Bulgarian authorities said they suspected Russian involvement but would not open a formal investigation, citing how prevalent such events had become. Finnish carrier Finnair temporarily suspended flights to Tartu, Estonia, over persistent GPS interference.
Institutions are responding; the deeper questions remain open
The political response has gathered force. In March 2025, eight European countries filed a formal complaint with the United Nations. Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden, Germany, and other Baltic and Nordic states have officially characterised the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference as Russian hybrid warfare, Defense News reported.
The European Union has been investigating the satellite-linked incidents, though the results of its inquiry remain classified, an EU spokesperson confirmed to the New York Times. The EU is separately developing a system to detect and locate interference sources. Researchers and European institutions are working on countermeasures, though the timeline for any operational deployment has not been confirmed.
What the investigation has not resolved is as consequential as what it has established. Whether the EKS satellites are used deliberately for interference, or whether the disruptions are an inadvertent side effect of their primary detection mission, is not known. The study confirmed three events definitively; whether the remaining 72 of the 75 documented wide-area disruptions share the same origin has not been established. How many EKS satellites beyond those identified are involved, and the full parameters of their operations, also remain unclear.
Ground-based transmitters operate within geographic limits. Satellites in Molniya orbit do not. The confirmation of a space-based interference source — even one whose intent is disputed — introduces a dimension to European navigation security that existing detection and countermeasure frameworks were not designed to confront.
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