China has committed more than $400 billion to nearly 600 projects across 54 Muslim-majority countries — a figure disclosed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Islamabad. The number is the clearest public measure yet of a decade-long campaign to shift Beijing's standing in Muslim-majority regions from peripheral player to central partner.
The strategy rests on four interlocking tools: hard infrastructure investment through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the adoption of Islamic finance to fund projects in Sharia-compliant markets, a drive to capture the global halal industry, and sustained soft-power outreach through religious exchanges, scholarships, and cultural programmes.
The BRI was itself unveiled on Muslim soil. President Xi Jinping announced the Silk Road Economic Belt in Kazakhstan in September 2013 and the 21st Maritime Silk Road in Indonesia in October 2013, according to China Daily Hong Kong. The initiative now spans around 70 countries, covering roughly 65% of the world's population and 40% of global gross domestic product (GDP), with China prepared to spend nearly $150 billion per year alongside partner countries, according to Gulf Times.
Islamic finance becomes a practical necessity, not an ideological choice
Many BRI partner countries are governed by Islamic law, or have populations for whom Sharia-compliant financing — which prohibits interest payments in favour of profit-sharing or asset-backed structures — is a condition of participation. That has made Islamic finance a transactional requirement for BRI delivery rather than an ideological concession. Islamic banks from the Middle East and Southeast Asia have committed to BRI investments and engaged China directly after Beijing amended its banking regulations to facilitate domestic Islamic finance, Gulf Times reported.
China's domestic motivation for such products is limited. Its Muslim population stands at approximately 20 million, providing little commercial incentive for Chinese banks to develop Sharia-compliant offerings at home. The international logic is more compelling, Reuters has reported. Financing BRI projects in Muslim-majority markets requires structures that host governments and their populations will accept.
At the governmental level, Beijing's primary official vehicle for Islamic finance engagement is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral development bank founded and led by China. The AIIB has held discussions with the Islamic Development Bank, a Saudi Arabia-based institution, and the two organisations share 20 member countries, Reuters reported. The precise scale and terms of Islamic finance instruments actually deployed in BRI projects are not publicly established.
Halal food exports and people-to-people outreach extend the playbook
Beyond banking, China has positioned itself to capture the global halal market — products and services compliant with Islamic law. Central to that effort is Ningxia, China's sole autonomous region designated for the Hui Muslim minority. The Hui community's halal food industry has become a pivotal element of the Communist Party's strategy to use BRI as a channel for expanding Chinese halal exports, according to the Middle East Institute. Whether Chinese halal certification is accepted or contested by international Islamic standards bodies remains an open question.
Soft-power investment runs alongside the commercial push. In July 2026, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) — Indonesia's top body of Islamic scholars — travelled to China on a five-day 'Digital Silk Road' programme, visiting Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The visit covered technology, halal industries, education, and cultural exchange, Asia Times reported. Indonesia is home to the world's largest Muslim population, making the MUI one of the most consequential Islamic institutions globally.
The MUI engagement is the most visible recent expression of a broader campaign. Over the past decade, China has expanded outreach to Indonesian Islamic organisations through educational exchanges, scholarships, economic cooperation, religious dialogue, and social programmes aimed at building people-to-people ties, Asia Times reported.
Arab-world diplomacy deepens, but significant questions remain unanswered
In the Arab world, China formalised its approach in a 2016 policy paper. Since then, Beijing has pursued what analysts describe as quiet but determined diplomacy, positioning itself as a "third voice" and impartial mediator in regional conflicts — including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iranian nuclear negotiations, and the Yemen civil war, according to GIS Reports. The 2022 China-Arab States Summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit, both held in Riyadh, were described as the product of a long process of reflection and diplomatic engagement by Beijing, GIS Reports noted.
Significant questions surround the strategy's limits and reception. How Muslim-majority governments and their populations privately assess China's intentions is not fully visible from official statements. The treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang — a western Chinese region where international governments and human rights organisations have documented mass detention and surveillance — represents a persistent tension that Beijing's diplomatic outreach has not resolved. China disputes those characterisations.
Whether the domestic regulatory changes Beijing has introduced have produced a functioning Islamic finance sector inside China, and at what scale, is also not publicly established. What the $400 billion investment figure and the MUI visit share is the same underlying logic: Beijing has concluded that influence across the Muslim world is worth building systematically, and is prepared to deploy capital, institutions, and soft power in concert to secure it.
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